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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between capital ratios, the cost of 
intermediation and risk taking in banking by considering the presence of self-interested 
managers. To our knowledge such problems have never been taken into consideration in the 
empirical literature on the link between bank capital and risk. Using a simultaneous equations 
model applied to monthly data over the 2004-2007 period for 99 Indonesian commercial 
banks, we find that a higher capital ratio is associated with an increase in the cost of 
intermediation and a decrease in risk and profitability. Hence, there is a strong presumption 
that managers might be driving banks to become safer but less profitable since more risky but 
also more profitable loans could be bypassed. Moreover, our results show that domestic 
private-owned banks are more likely to suffer from a managerial self-interest problem than 
state-owned banks, joint-venture banks, and foreign-owned banks. Our findings support the 
call for the implementation of the ownership consolidation policy to enhance shareholders‘ 
domination in Indonesian banks, notably in private-owned banks. 
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1. Introduction 
 In spite of a growing literature analyzing the link between capital requirements and 
bank risk, no consensus has been reached on the sign of the relationship between both 
dimensions. Both theoretical and empirical papers, ranging from portfolio theory-based 
approaches (Kahane, 1977; Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988) to 
incentive-based approaches (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Blum, 1999; Milne, 2002; Blum, 
2003; Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005) remain inconclusive.  
 In the context where a bank acts as a portfolio manager, higher capital requirements 
will directly alter the bank‘s leverage ratio. As a consequence, the bank will reshuffle its 
portfolio by selecting riskier assets (loans) to maintain its expected return on equity at an 
optimal level (Kahane, 1977; Koehn and Santomero, 1980). However, building on the same 
portfolio selection framework, Milne (2002) argues that this literature fails to ―treat banks as 
forward looking optimizers balancing the benefits of their lending decisions against the cost 
of regulatory breach‖, where such behaviours depend on how shareholders and bankers 
manage banks‘ capital adequacy ratios and loan porfolios.  
 In line with this view, Bris and Cantale (2004) consider that the previous literature on 
bank capital requirements only views the bank as a whole and hence fails to consider agency 
conflicts among shareholders and bankers (managers). Moreover, Hughes and Mestler (1994) 
explicitly highlight that bank managers are not maximizing shareholders‘ value. While such 
agency conflicts are widely explored in the corporate finance literature, only a few papers deal 
with this issue regarding banking firms.  
 Gorton and Rosen (1995) are the first to model banks‘ portfolio management and 
internal agency conflicts to explain the continuous decline in U.S. banks‘ profitability during 
the 1980s. In their model, there are two types of managers who have private benefit to 
control, namely ―good‖ managers and ―bad‖ managers. In facing declining investment 
opportunities in the U.S. market, the good managers choose either ―profitable‖ risky loans or 
―profitable‖ safe loans, while the bad managers choose either ―unprofitable‖ risky loans 
(excessive risk taking) or ―unprofitable‖ safe loans (excessive entrenchment). When banks 
have a large proportion of bad managers and bank shareholders can only imperfectly control 
them, the aggregate risk taking may be excessive, as long as deposit insurance exists and 
capital requirements are easily satisfied. Since their model does not consider the role played 
by the regulator to discipline banks‘ behaviour, there is no explicit external agency conflict 
between the banks‘ shareholders and the regulator.  
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 Gorton and Rosen (1995) also show that such managerial entrenchment to take on 
excessive risk is due to the incentives that managers face when the fraction of the bank they 
own is large enough for them to make outside discipline costly, but not large enough for their 
interests to be aligned with those of outsiders. They further establish conditions in which the 
relationship between managerial ownership and risk taking can take the form of an inverse U-
shape curve.  
 Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) build a model of banks‘ portfolio management where 
external agency conflicts (regulator-shareholder) exist and moral hazard can be constrained by 
the regulator‘s action. In their model, the regulator, bank shareholders and the manager have 
different ―domination power‖ on bank portfolios. If the regulator (or the deposit insurance 
company) dominates, its objective is to minimize the option value of deposit insurance, i.e. 
bank default risk, which can only be achieved under a high level of the capital adequacy ratio. 
If shareholders dominate, their objective is to choose risk-taking strategies that maximize the 
expected value of bank equity. But if managers dominate, their objective is to manage risk to 
maximize the expected value of their private benefits of control. However, the impact of such 
managerial behaviour on bank default risk remains unclear.  
 Sullivan and Spong (2007) empirically highlight that managerial stock ownership 
boosts risk-taking strategies indicating that hired managers are more likely to have incentives 
in line with those of shareholders. However, Saunders et al. (1990) find that ―entrenched-
manager-controlled‖ banks are less risky than ―shareholder-controlled‖ banks during the 
1979-1982 period of relative deregulation. Some papers also find U-shaped relationships 
between managerial ownership and bank risk taking, which is also due to managerial 
entrenchments (Chen et al., 1998; Anderson et al., 2000). To deal with managerial 
entrenchments, John et al. (2000) are the first to build a theoretical model analyzing the 
optimal package of managerial compensation under capital requirement rules and deposit 
insurance. Unfortunately, in their model, regulation does not play any role regarding 
managerial entrenchments and, thus, it is somehow irrelevant. 
 Extending Saunders et al. (1990) and John et al. (2000), Bris and Cantale (2004) build 
a theoretical model that analyzes the implications of capital requirements on managerial self-
interest and bank risk taking. Under asymmetric information between shareholders and 
managers, a higher capital requirement will drive self-interested managers to monitor bank 
loan portfolios and comply with the new requirement (increase the capital adequacy ratio). 
Self-interested managers will follow such a strategy to maximize their compensation, since 
bank failure or a decline in the capital adequacy ratio will lower managerial compensation. As 
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a consequence, to preserve their compensation, managers might target safer loan portfolios at 
the cost of an increase in inefficiency due to excessive monitoring costs. Hence, banks might 
become too safe and less profitable because more socially desirable risky loans (but also more 
profitable) are possibly bypassed. In this setting, bank shareholders should provide managers 
with a better compensation package that is compatible with managerial efforts in producing 
socially desirable risky loans to maintain shareholders‘ profitability. The optimum 
compensation package should be negatively related to the capital adequacy ratio and 
positively linked  to risk taking.  
 In parallel, empirical papers on capital requirements mainly analyze the problem of 
bank capitalization and its impact on risk and profitability, without taking into account agency 
conflicts between shareholders and managers (see for example, Aggarwal and Jacques (2001), 
Rime (2001), Bischel and Blum (2004), Lin et al. (2005), Murinde (2006)). An exception is 
Altunbas et al. (2007) and Laeven and Levine (2009) who provide evidence which is 
somehow close to our objective in examining the managerial self-interest problem. In the case 
of European banks during the period 1992-2000, Altunbas et al. (2007) report that banks with 
more capital tend to be less efficient; but they also tend to take on excessive risk. Hence, there 
is no evidence that bank capital raises the managerial self-interest problems that drive bank 
portfolios to become safer but less profitable. Laeven and Levine (2009) analyze a large 
sample of 288 banks from 48 countries during the 1996-2001 period  and show that capital 
requirements and more stringent bank activity restrictions are associated with higher risk in 
banks having a sufficiently powerful shareholder, but the opposite is true in widely-held 
banks when shareholders‘ domination is relatively weak. However, their work does not 
explicitly consider domination by self-interested managers which probably occurs in widely-
held banks with weaker shareholders and that might boost the bank‘s safety and inefficiency 
at the same time.  
 To our best knowledge, there has been no attempt to empirically analyze the presence 
of self-interested managers through the link between bank capital ratios and risk taking. The 
present paper aims to fulfil this gap. To assess these predictions, we focus on the Indonesian 
banking industry, where capitalization, governance and ownership have become major policy 
issues in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis (Pangestu, 2003). We work on monthly data for 99 
commercial banks with four different ownership types (state-owned, private-owned, joint-
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venture, and foreign-owned bank). Our study covers the 2004-2007 period  when strict 
regulations were introduced on bank capital in Indonesia2.  
Our approach to assess this issue is related to Altunbas et al. (2007), Laeven and 
Levine (2009) and also, more generally, to the broad literature on bank ownership structure 
and risk taking (Saunders et al., 1990; Sullivan and Spong, 2007). However, instead of 
separating banks into two groups (―shareholder-controlled banks‖ and ―manager-controlled 
banks‖) we capture the managerial domination problem by building on the work of Naceur 
and Kandil (2009) and Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004). Naceur and Kandil (2009) study the 
impact of capital requirements on the cost of intermediation and profitability in Egyptian 
banks during 1989-20043, while Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004) emphasize the use of the cost of 
intermediation and overhead costs to tackle bank inefficiency issues. 
Because we use monthly data for a relatively short time period, standard measures of 
inefficiency such as efficiency scores or proxies such as the cost-to-income ratio are less 
likely to capture movements in monitoring costs and managers' decisions to raise or reduce 
interest margins to adjust their risk exposure. Specifically, in this paper we construct a 
profitability-adjusted net interest margin measure as a proxy of the cost of intermediation 
which captures movements in the interest margin that are not linked to changes in 
profitability. As a result, our measure captures changes in price mark up (margin setting) 
behavior and in managers' risk tolerance and/or monitoring effort that are not associated with 
lower or higher profitability.  
 In Naceur and Kandil (2009), an increase in the cost of intermediation (net interest 
margin) due to a higher capital adequacy ratio is followed by an increase in bank profitability. 
In our setting, by accounting for possible governance issues, we consider that self-interested 
managers are more likely to exist in a bank, when an increase in the cost of intermediation is 
followed by a decrease in a bank‘s profitability. In this case, a rise in the cost of 
intermediation can be due to an excessive increase in monitoring costs borne by managers 
who dominate banks4. Therefore, following Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), and 
                                                 
2
 Since January 2004, entry to the banking industry has been tightened with a minimum capital requirement of 3 
trillion Rupiah (US$335 million) while all types of banks including banks established by regional governments 
should also reach a minimum capital of 100 billion Rupiah by 2010 and 80 billion Rupiah by the end of 2008. 
These regulations are well-known as the Indonesian Banking Architecture established on January, 2004.  
3
 Bernanke (1983) defines the cost of intermediation as the cost of channelling funds from the ultimate 
savers/lenders into the hand of good borrowers, which includes screening, monitoring, accounting costs, and 
expected losses by bad borrowers.  
4
 Coleman et al. (2006) consider that banks with superior monitoring efforts are able to charge a higher cost of 
intermediation. Chen et al. (2000) also highlight the positive link between monitoring activities and loan spreads 
in the U.S. branches of Japanese banks.  
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Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004) we consider the cost of intermediation, i.e. the bank's net interest 
margin, as a measure of bank inefficiency. However, to go further in our investigation we also 
construct profitability-adjusted interest margins. 
 In addition, our motivation to address the issue of managerial self-interest is driven by 
the implementation of the Single Presence Policy (SPP) in Indonesia as of August 2006. 
Under the SPP, bank shareholders are only allowed to become controlling shareholders in one 
single banking institution, which enhances ownership concentration. However, the SPP 
exempts: (1) a controlling shareholder in two banks that have different lines of businesses (for 
example a conventional commercial bank and an Islamic bank), (2) a controlling shareholder 
in two banks one of which is a joint-venture bank, (3) A Bank Holding Company (BHC) that 
is set up to circumvent the Central Bank regulation concerning the SPP and (4) Temporary 
stakes by the Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation in the framework of bank recovery 
policies.  
In the meantime, Bank Indonesia as the regulator faces challenges in implementing the 
SPP in banks with different ownership types. The previous literature highlights that bank 
managers‘ decisions in terms of risk taking can be influenced by the ownership type of banks. 
State-owned banks usually tend to erode bank efficiency and to increase risk (Shleifer, 1998; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). However, Hadad et al (2009) show that state-owned banks in 
Indonesia are the most efficient ones. Moreover, the presence of foreign ownership is 
perceived to increase the level of competition in the banking industry and hence to improve 
bank efficiency (Denizer, 2000; Lensink and Hermes, 2003). Because the impact of 
ownership type on bank performance remains unclear, we further examine the impact of bank 
capital on inefficiency, risk, and profitability with respect to bank ownership type. This allows 
to possibly infer the presence of self-interested managers in each bank ownership type.   
Likewise, bank inefficiency with regard to intermediation activities has also become a 
major problem in Indonesian banks. The 2010 Indonesian Banking Statistics reports that the 
cost-to-income ratio, measured by the ratio of operating expenses to operating income, 
reached 89.5% in 2005 and 92.77 % at the beginning of 2010. Surprisingly, there has yet been 
no formal analysis explaining such a trend. Through the process our paper also contributes to 
better understanding this issue.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional 
background. Section 3 describes our data, variables and descriptive statistics. Section 4 
presents our hypotheses and econometric model. Section 5 discusses empirical results and 
section 6 provides robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
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2. Institutional Background 
 The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) has been one of the main policy concerns in 
Indonesian banking since it was established two decades ago. Following the basic standard 
laid down in the Basel I accord, commercial banks were required to meet a minimum of 8% 
of the total capital ratio (Tier 1 and Tier 2). Such a regulation was implemented to moderate 
the adverse effect of banking competition in the aftermath of financial deregulation in the 
1990s. However, at that time, banks tended to violate this regulation and responded to the 
competitive pressure by expanding credit to high-risk ventures which were politically 
connected. A large part of bank loans was found in the non-tradable sectors such as real 
estate, property and construction and ended up in default, which in turn forced banks to 
violate their reserve requirements to continue operating (Creed, 1999).  
 After the 1997 financial crisis, Bank Indonesia adopted regulatory forbearance by 
lowering the minimum requirement of the capital adequacy ratio from 8 to 4 % to provide 
―breathing space‖ for banks and borrowers. Together with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Indonesian government implemented the special surveillance‘s task which is 
similar to the 1991 US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), a 
system of capital-based regulation based on prompt corrective action (PCA).    
 Aside from bank capitalization, risk management also became an important issue in 
Indonesian banking after the 1997 crisis. After replacing the Acts of 1992 and 1998 by the 
Act of 2001 in order to raise capital requirements to 8 % again, Bank Indonesia issued a risk 
management framework (PBI No. 5/8/PBI/2003) for commercial banks as of May 19, 2003. 
This framework was applied to all types of banks in order to prepare the banking industry to 
move forward toward Basel II, without explicitly distinguishing small banks from large 
banks.  
 On January 2004, Indonesian Banking Architecture (IBA) introduced strict regulation 
of bank capital. Banking market entry was tightened with a minimum required capital of 3 
trillion Rupiah (US$335 million) while all types of banks, including banks established by 
regional governments were compelled to reach a minimum capital of 100 billion Rupiah by 
2010. To enforce this, on June 2005, Bank Indonesia further launched the new consolidation 
policy. Banks  were expected to hold a minimum core capital of 100 billion Rupiah (US$11 
million) by 2010 and 80 billion Rupiah by the end of 2007. 
 In the aftermath of the IBA implementation, performance in Indonesian banks showed 
an upward trend. The banking system‘s total assets increased from 1,112.2 trillion Rupiah in 
2002 to 1,720.9 trillion Rupiah in 2007. Total third party funds (savings, time deposits and 
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demand deposits) increased from 835.8 trillion Rupiah in 2002 to 1,305.9 trillion Rupiah in 
2007, although bank credit did not significantly increase. Bank loans only amounted to 455.31 
trillion Rupiah in 2007 after 410.29 trillion Rupiah in 2002. Instead, the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans decreased from 8.1 % in 2002 to 6.5 % possibly due to the 
improvement of the capital adequacy ratio during the 2004-2007 period.  
 However, banks had still performed their own mergers and acquisitions operations in 
order to follow the IBA. As a consequence, Bank Indonesia launched the Single Presence 
Policy (SPP) as of August 2006, which practically forbids a company or an individual to own 
more than one bank. Under the SPP, controlling shareholders who do not restructure their 
ownership endure a prohibitive sanction preventing them from being a controlling shareholder 
or holding more than 10% of equity in any bank in Indonesia. Such shareholders are also to be 
listed in the Not Pass List during 5 years.  
 For some investors who dominate the banking business in Indonesia, selling stakes 
either fully or partially, is not considered as an ideal strategy. In fact, there are alternative 
solutions that can be taken by controlling shareholders as a response to the SPP, without 
necessarily loosing stakes. Controlling shareholders can merge all their banks or establish a 
Bank Holding Company (BHC)5. However, the debate regarding the SPP implementation is 
still open regarding the consolidation of banks with different ownership types. In dealing with 
such a controversy, Bank Indonesia as a regulator needs a benchmark to assess whether 
consolidation through the SPP is really necessary and how it could operate for banks with 
different ownership structures.  
 
3. Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data  
 At the end of 2007, there are 104 commercial banks operating in Indonesia that consist 
of 5 state-owned banks, 71 private-owned banks, 18 joint-venture banks, and 11 foreign-
owned banks. State-owned commercial banks are commercial banks whose shares are entirely 
owned by the government. Private-owned commercial banks are owned by private investors. 
Joint-venture commercial banks are commercial banks founded jointly by two parties: the first 
group consists of one or more commercial banks based in Indonesia and owned by Indonesian 
citizens and/or an Indonesian legal entity owned by Indonesian citizens; the second group 
                                                 
5
 According to Indonesian Banking Architecture issued by BI in 2004, the number of commercial banks in 
Indonesia should be around 35-58 banks in 2010. Thus, if establishing a BHC is chosen by all controlling 
shareholders, the BI purpose for reducing the number of banks in 2010 cannot be achieved as well, since the 
creation of BHCs will add a new entity of banks in the financial system.  
  9 
consists of one or more banks that are domiciled outside the country. The maximum capital 
allowed for the second group is 85% of total capital in establishing a joint-venture bank. 
Foreign-owned commercial banks are fully owned by foreign investors.  
 In this paper, we use monthly bank balance sheet and income statement data provided 
by the Central Bank of Indonesia, for 99 commercial banks covering the 2004-2007 period. 
Our sample consists of 5 state-owned banks, 65 private-owned banks, 18 joint-venture banks, 
and 11 foreign-owned banks, representing more than 96% of the total assets of Indonesian 
commercial banks. We also retrieve macroeconomic-level data from the Bureau of Statistics 
of Indonesia. Since we intend to analyze the interactions between capital ratios, inefficiency 
and risk taking, we consider that these variables are simultaneously determined.  
 Following Altunbas et al. (2007), we define the capital ratio (EQTA) as the ratio of 
equity to total assets. Since this measure is a standard measure of leverage, it allows us to 
directly deal with possible agency problems between shareholders and managers which can be 
due to an increase in equity.  
 Since our focus on bank inefficiency is associated with bank intermediation activities, 
we account for such inefficiency by two alternative proxies of the cost of intermediation 
(INTCOST). This is because, as argued above, we use monthly data for a relatively short time 
period and thus, standard measures of inefficiency such as efficiency scores or proxies such as 
the cost-to-income ratio or the overhead cost ratio are less likely to capture movements in 
monitoring costs and managers' decisions to raise or reduce interest margins to adjust their 
risk exposure. Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004) use the net interest margin (NIM) and the ratio of 
overhead costs to total assets as proxies of the cost of intermediation to study the impact of 
market structure, regulation, and institutions on the cost of intermediation.  Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (1999), and Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier (2005) also use a similar approach 
using the ratio of net interest income to total assets as the proxy of net interest margin6. In this 
paper, we therefore focus on the two variables based on the net interest margin and the 
personnel costs ratio.  
As a first step, we measure net interest margin (NIM) by computing the ratio of net 
interest income to total assets. However, an increase in bank net interest margin can also 
reflect a higher profitability and not necessarily an increase in bank intermediation cost. 
                                                 
6
 An unbiased measure of the pure intermediation margin would be the difference between the lending rate and 
the cost of deposits. However, such data are not available in the Indonesian banks‘ income statements. Our 
measure of the cost of intermediation implicitly assumes that the other interest revenues (e.g on securities) and 
interest expenses (e.g. on interbank borrowing) reflect competitive markets across banks. This assumption is also 
introduced by Claeys and Vennet (2008) due to data unavailability. 
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Therefore, as a second step,  we also construct a measure of profitability-adjusted bank 
intermediation cost. Specifically, we use the residual terms of a regression of NIM on bank 
profitability both measured by the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE)7. 
This variable, RNIM, is expected to capture movements in the net interest margin that are not 
related to changes in bank profitability. As a result, our measure captures changes in margin 
setting behavior and in managers' risk tolerance and/or monitoring effort which are not linked 
with profitability motivation. For instance, an increase (decrease) in RNIM can be interpreted 
as a per se safer (riskier) behavior which is, by construction, uncorrelated with profitability. 
Identically, an increase in RNIM can be understood as more effort to monitor borrowers or 
more costly monitoring which are not directly motivated by a higher required profitability.   
Meanwhile, for the personnel expenses variable, we use the ratio of personnel 
expenses to gross operating revenue (PERSON). PERSON reflects all personnel costs related 
to bank operations including loan monitoring activities. To sum up, the cost of intermediation 
measure (INTCOST) consists, alternately, of RNIM or PERSON. 
 Moreover, to capture bank performance (PERFORM), we use several alternative 
proxies associated with bank risk and profitability. To account for default risk, we use the Z-
score that indicates the number of standard deviations that the bank‘s return on equity (ROE) 
has to drop below its expected value before equity is depleted. Thus, a higher Z-score is 
associated with a lower bank insolvency risk. The Z-score is defined as:  
 
ti
ti
ti SDROE
MROE
ROE
,
,
,
1
Z
  
where SDROE is the standard deviation of ROE, while MROE is the average value of ROE. 
Both SDROE and MROE are computed on the basis of observations of ROE from time t to t – 
5  (a six period-based rolling window). Alternatively, as a proxy of risk taking, we also 
consider SDROE as the dependent variable. Finally, in order to measure profitability, we draw 
the measures that are commonly used in the literature. These consist of the return on equity 
(ROE) and the return on assets (ROA). To sum up, PERFORM is either ZROE, SDROE, ROE 
or ROA.  
 
3.2. The Determinants of the Capital Ratio 
 We incorporate INTCOST as an endogenous regressor even though, as noted by 
Altunbas et al. (2007), the impact of bank efficiency on bank capital is ambiguous. 
                                                 
7
 ROE is the ratio of net income to total equity, while ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
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Meanwhile, since the capital ratio is an indicator of the bank‘s safety, this ratio can be 
influenced by either bank risk or profitability. We thus consider bank performance measures 
(PERFORM) as an endogenous regressor.  
Bank size can also matter in explaining bank capital management. To account for this 
dimension, we include the logarithm of bank total assets (SIZE) as an explanatory variable. 
Larger banks hold lower capital ratios due to their comparative advantage in terms of 
economies of scale in monitoring and screening activities as well as in terms of product 
diversification. Also, from a safety net perspective (systemic risk) larger banks can be viewed 
as ‗Too-Big-To-Fail‘ (TBTF) or ‗Too-Big-To-Discipline-Adequately‘ (TBTDA) (Kane 2000; 
Mishkin 2006)8. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between SIZE and the capital ratio.  
 Besides bank size, the capital ratio can also depend on the extent of loan activities in 
the balance sheet . We therefore include the ratio of loans to total asset (LOAN). LOAN is 
expected to have a positive effect on the bank‘s capital ratio, since more bank capital is 
needed to cover risk incurred by the loan activities (Jokipii et al., 2008; Ayuso et al., 2004). 
 In addition, some empirical papers shed light on the procyclicality issue of bank 
capital (Jokipii et al., 2008; Ayuso et al., 2004; Borio et al., 2001). Following Schaeck and 
Cihák (2007), we include the growth of real gross domestic product (GDPG) as one of the 
determinants of bank capital ratios. GDPG is based on the quarterly data of real gross 
domestic product taken from the Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia.  
 Bank regulation may also play a crucial role in disciplining banks‘ behavior (Milne, 
2002). Thus, we include a regulatory dummy variable to capture the implementation of the 
Indonesian Banking Architecture (IBA). This dummy variable takes the value of 1 as of June 
2005 and 0 otherwise.  
Finally, as the ownership type of banks can influence bank behaviour in managing 
their capital ratio (Memmel and Raupach, 2007), we also include four bank ownership 
dummy variables: state-owned banks (SOB), private-owned banks (POB), joint-venture banks 
(JVB) and foreign-owned banks (FOB), as explanatory variables9.   
  
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 In Indonesia, a formal deposit insurance system was introduced in March 2007.  
9
 SOB is constructed by assigning a value of 1 when a bank is state-owned, and zero otherwise. POB, JVB, FOB 
are constructed analogically with a value of 1 when a bank is privately owned, joint-venture owned, and foreign 
owned, respectively, and zero otherwise.  
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3.3. The Determinants of the Cost of Intermediation  
 Since we intend to analyze the relationship between the capital ratio and bank 
intermediation cost, we directly include the capital ratio (EQTA) as an endogenous regressor. 
Besides, we also incorporate bank performance (PERFORM) as an endogenous regressor, in 
order to build a simultaneous equations system. However, the expected sign may vary 
regarding the relationship between bank performance (risk and profitability) and the cost of 
intermediation. The sign will depend on the expertise of banks‘ managers to manage and 
monitor bank portfolios. 
 In the meantime, several papers show that bank concentration can influence the cost of 
intermediation (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2004; Naceur and 
Kandil, 2009, etc). A higher degree of concentration in the banking industry enables banks to 
increase their lending rate and hence the cost of intermediation. In this paper, bank 
concentration (CFIVE) is measured by the total asset share of the five largest banks in the 
banking system. Market power is also a crucial determinant of the cost of intermediation. 
There are three hypotheses explaining the link between market structure and the cost of 
intermediation. First, the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis emphasizes a 
positive relationship between a bank‘s market power and the cost of intermediation due to 
non-competitive pricing behaviour in a concentrated market. Second, the relative-market 
hypothesis highlights that only banks with higher product differentiation capacity can benefit 
from non-competitive pricing in a concentrated market (Berger, 1995). Third, the efficient-
structure hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between operational efficiency and the 
cost of intermediation. To account for market power and efficiency, we introduce the bank‘s 
market share (MPOW), measured by the ratio of a bank‘s total assets to the overall assets of 
the banking system and the ratio of operating expenses to total assets (OVERHEAD) as 
control variables. The expected sign of MPOW is undetermined but the expected relationship 
between OVERHEAD and the cost of intermediation is positive according to the efficient-
structure hypothesis (Naceur and Kandil, 2009).  
 Moreover, we also include the ratio of loans to deposits (LDR) as a liquidity measure, 
wherein deposits consist of demand deposits, saving and time deposits. Higher LDR denotes 
lower bank liquidity indicating that a bank faces the risk of not having sufficient cash reserves 
to cope with deposit withdrawals. Predictions vary regarding the impact of liquidity on the 
cost of intermediation. On the one hand, a higher LDR can force banks to reduce the cost of 
intermediation as they intend to reduce non-earning assets (increase loan activities) in order to 
maintain their profitability (Naceur and Kandil, 2009). The reduction in the cost of 
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intermediation can be also due to competition in the deposit market (Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 
2004). On the other hand, a higher LDR can encourage banks to increase the cost of 
intermediation in order to maintain profit when credit demand is limited due to tight 
conditions on the financial market. We also include the four ownership type dummy variables 
(SOB, POB, JVB, FOB), as bank ownership type may influence the capital ratio, the cost of 
intermediation, and risk.  However, prediction varies with regard to these relationships, since 
they are empirical in nature.  
 
3.4. The Determinants of Bank Performance 
 We directly include the ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA) and the cost of 
intermediation measures (INTCOST) as endogenous regressors. We also include the ratio of 
total loans to total assets (LOAN). Loans (LOAN) are at the core of bank risk and profitability 
captured by PERFORM, but the expected link between LOAN and PERFORM depends on the 
dimension, either risk or profitability, which is represented by PERFORM. The relationship 
between LOAN and risk measures as well as between LOAN and profitability measures could 
be negative. Following Bris and Cantale (2004), such a negative relationship can be due to the 
presence of self-interest managers, where risky but more profitable loans are bypassed by 
managers who dominate shareholders in bank portfolio allocation decisions. Moreover, we 
include the ratio of total deposits to total asset (DTA), wherein deposits consist of savings, 
demand deposits and time deposits. Since deposits are insured, a higher DTA potentially 
increases bank moral hazard to fund risky projects. Meanwhile, a higher DTA also reflects an 
increase in leverage risk. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between DTA and bank risk, 
but the link between DTA and bank profitability remains ambiguous. The ratio of loan loss 
provisions to total loans (LLP) is also considered as an explanatory variable in the PERFORM 
equation. Since LLP is a credit risk measure, we expect a positive relationship between LLP 
and bank risk, but how LLP affects bank profitability is undertermined. Finally, we also 
incorporate GDPG to account for macroeconomic performance, and the four ownership type 
dummies (SOB, POB, JVB, POB), since ownership type may influence bank risk and returns.  
 
3.5. Data Selection 
  We impose several restrictions on our data to ensure that our work is conducted on a 
clean sample. First, we exclude all negative values of equity since there is no information on 
whether or not such negative values are related to the government‘s bailout policy. We have 
cross-checked these data with data from a different source, Bankscope, and have noticed that 
  14 
equity values provided by Bankscope for such banks are positive. Second, we eliminate the 
extreme bank/year observations (2.5% highest values) for the ratio of loans to deposits (LDR), 
since LDR has a right-skewed distribution. For the return on equity ratio (ROE) and the ratio 
of personnel expenses to gross operating revenue (PERSON), we exclude their 2.5% lowest 
and 2.5% highest values, since their distribution exhibits very long tails on both sides. Finally, 
we also exclude all values above 100% for the ratio of deposits to total assets (DTA).  
 
3.6. Descriptive Statistics 
 The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 while correlations are detailed in 
Table 2. The variables do not exhibit major colinearity issues, except for MPOW and SIZE or 
DTA and ROE which we do not concurrently use as regressors in our estimations. 
Insert Table 1 and 2 here 
 
4. Hypotheses and Econometric Specification 
 
4.1. Hypotheses 
 The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we examine if there might be a self-
interested manager effect in Indonesian banks by scrutinizing the link between capital, the 
cost of intermediation, risk, and profitability; second, we seek to identify banks‘ ownership 
types which are more likely to suffer from a possible managerial self-interest problem.  
 Regarding the first objective, we test the following hypothesis based on the theoretical 
contribution of Bris and Cantale (2004):  
 
Hypothesis 1: Managers in Indonesian banks are likely to be self-interested; if so, a higher 
capital adequacy ratio would be associated with an increase in the cost of intermediation due 
to monitoring costs borne by bank managers who behave conservatively by increasing the 
safety of loan portfolios but by making them less profitable.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is not rejected if a higher capital ratio is associated with an increase in the cost 
of intermediation but a decrease in risk and profitability. In such a case, we conclude that 
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there is a strong presumption that managers are likely to be self-interested10. To examine 
Hypothesis 1, we construct the following simultaneous equations model. 
 
 
 
         
      
(1) 
 
    
The set of exogenous regressors consists of SIZE, LOAN, GDPG, IBA, SOB, POB, JVB, FOB, 
CFIVE, MPOW, OVERHEAD, LDR, DTA, and LLP.  
The simultaneous equations model in System (1) is comparable to prior models on 
bank capital, efficiency and risk (Altunbas et al., 2007; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). Under 
Hypothesis 1, 1  and 1  are expected to be positive and negative respectively. There are three 
structural equations in (1), where ti, , ti ,  and ti,  are residual terms, and i0 , i0  and i0  
are individual fixed effects. The variables EQTA, INTCOST and PERFORM are endogenously 
determined. The first equation (EQTA) contains the factors that are expected to influence 
banks‘ capital ratios. In the second equation (INTCOST), we attempt to examine whether a 
higher capital ratio (EQTA) is associated with an increase in the cost of intermediation. In the 
third equation (PERFORM), we examine whether a higher capital ratio is associated with a 
decrease in risk and profitability. If bank managers are more likely to be self-interested, we 
should find 01   and 01  :a higher capital ratio is associated with an increase in the cost 
of intermediation, but a decrease in risk and profitability.  
 It is also well admitted that bank managerial decision and bank risk taking can be 
influenced by the ownership type and ownership structure of banks (Iannotta et al., 2007 and 
Barry et al., 2011). Ownership types that received a particular attention in Indonesian 
commercial banks are state-owned banks (SOB), private-owned banks (POB), joint-venture 
                                                 
10
 To cope with self-interested managers, Bris and Cantale (2004) set a condition in which bank shareholders 
need to offer managers an optimal compensation package to restore efficiency. This compensation package is a 
function of managers‘ efforts. However, this issue is beyond the scope of our paper. 
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banks (JVB), and foreign-owned banks (FOB). Our second objective is therefore to 
investigate whether such relationships depend on the ownership type of banks. For this 
purpose, we specify Hypothesis 2 as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2  : The impact of a higher capital adequacy ratio on the cost of intermediation, 
risk and profitability is not similar for banks with different ownership types.   
 
Therefore, we attempt to reject the null : 
H0 : 
1S 1P 1JV 1F
1S 1P 1JV 1F
and
              
in the following model (2) in which interaction variables are added to capture such differential 
effects: 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Econometric Method 
 In estimating System (1), we attempt to overcome various econometric problems that 
may arise.  
First, we handle endogeneity issues regarding all our variables using the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) for two reasons: this method is robust to the errors distribution and is 
considered as more efficient than Two-Stages Least Squares (2SLS) because it accounts for 
heteroskedasticity (Hall, 2005).  
Second, the right-hand side of each equation in System (1) comprises four time-invariant 
variables related to bank ownership type (SOB, POB, JVB, and FOB). In this regard, 
individual fixed effects could not be taken directly into account in the GMM estimation. 
Meanwhile, correction for individual fixed effects is essential to tackle the problem of 
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possible omitted variables.  To deal with this problem, we follow Plumper and Troeger 
(2007)11.  
Third, and most probably, the three errors are cross – correlated in System (1). Therefore, we 
opt for a simultaneous equations approach in solving System (1) with a covariance matrix 
which accounts for cross equation errors correlation.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 Tables 3 and 4 sum up the results of the GMM estimation of System (1) when we use 
respectively the profitability-adjusted net interest margin (RNIM) and the ratio of personnel 
expenses to operating income ratio (PERSON) as proxies for the cost of intermediation. In 
regressions 1 to 4  we alternately consider the four definitions of PERFORM that consist of 
risk and profitability proxies (ZROE, SDROE, ROE and ROA).   
 
Insert Table 3 and Table 4 here 
  
To assess Hypothesis 1, we proceed in two steps. First, we examine the relationship between 
EQTA and bank intermediation cost measured by both the profitability-adjusted net interest 
margin (RNIM) and the personnel expenses ratio (PERSON). Second, we examine the 
relationship between EQTA and bank risk (ZROE or SDROE) and profitability (ROE or ROA).  
 In the first step, Table 3 shows that a higher capital ratio is associated with an increase 
in the cost of intermediation. Such a relationship is shown by the positive significant 
coefficients associating EQTA and RNIM in Regression 1 to 3 at the 1% significance level. 
We also find a positive significant relationship between EQTA and the personnel expenses 
ratio (PERSON) at the 1% significance level, as shown in Regression 1, 2 and 4 in Table 4.  
In the second step, we examine the link between the capital ratio and performance. 
Table 3 shows that a higher capital ratio is associated with a decrease in insolvency risk 
(ZROE), risk taking (SDROE), and profitability (ROE and ROA) as shown in Regressions 1 to 
4. In Table 4, we also find similar relationships, although EQTA is not significant in the ROA 
equation.  
On the basis of these two procedures, Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected and hence, 
according to our results, there is a strong presumption that bank managers are likely to be 
                                                 
11
 As a first step all the variables are centred on their individual means, such that all time invariant regressors 
disappear. Then, we estimate individual fixed effects which are, in turn, regressed on time invariant regressors. 
We obtain the unexplained components of fixed effects which are, eventually, jointly reintroduced in the model 
with the full set of regressors (both time varying and non-time varying).  
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self-interested. In other words, bank managers might be driving banks to become safer but 
unfortunately less profitable, since more risky but also more profitable loans are bypassed.  
 To investigate whether the behaviour of managers is similar in banks with different 
ownership types, we consider the results obtained by estimating System (2). The interaction 
terms associating EQTA and the four ownership dummies are the key variables for this 
purpose. Tables 5 and 6 summarize results with RNIM and PERSON as proxies of the 
intermediation cost respectively.  
 
Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here 
 
 In state-owned banks, a higher capital ratio is associated with an increase in the cost of 
intermediation measured by the profitability-adjusted net interest margin (RNIM) and the 
personnel expense ratio (PERSON) as shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. However, there 
is no significant impact of the capital ratio on risk and profitability of state-owned banks. 
Such findings may highlight that state-owned banks exhibit greater intermediation cost when 
the capital ratio increases. However, there is no presumption regarding the possible presence 
of self-interested managers in state-owned banks. 
 In private-owned banks, a higher capital ratio is associated with an increase in the cost 
of intermediation, as measured by either RNIM (Table 5 – Regressions 1) or PERSON (Table 
6 –   Regressions 2 and 3). A higher capital ratio is also associated with a decrease in risk, 
measured by either ZROE (Table 5 – Regressions 1; and Table 6 – Regression 1) or SDROE 
(Table 5 – Regression 2). Moreover, there is also a negative relationship between the capital 
ratio and bank profitability as shown in both Table 5 (Regressions 3 and 4) and Table 6 
(Regression 3). Therefore, for private-owned banks Hypothesis 1 is not rejected and hence, 
we can suspect the presence of self-interested managers in such institutions.   
 For joint-venture banks, the capital ratio is significantly and positively linked to the 
profitability-adjusted net interest margin, as shown in Table 5 (Regressions 1, 3 and 4), but 
negatively related to the personnel expense ratio as shown in Table 6 (Regressions 1, 3, and 
4). From Table 5 (Regressions 1 and 2), an increase in the capital ratio positively affects 
insolvency risk and risk taking. Meanwhile, there is a weak negative relationship between the 
capital ratio and bank profitability (Table 5 – Regression 3; and Table 6 – Regression 3). 
These relationships indicate that the managerial self-interest problems are less likely to exist 
in joint-venture banks.   
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 Finally, for foreign-owned banks, Table 6 (Regressions 1 and 3) shows that a higher 
capital ratio is associated with an increase in the personnel expense ratio. Meanwhile, there is 
a positive relationship between the capital ratio and insolvency risk (Table 5 – Regression 1). 
Similarly to joint-venture banks, the positive link between bank capital and risk also holds for 
foreign-owned banks as shown in Table 6 (Regression 2). In addition, a higher capital ratio is 
also associated with an increase in profitability (Table 5 - Regression 4, and Table 6 - 
Regression 3). Similarly to joint-venture banks, the managerial self-interest problems are less 
likely to exist in foreign-owned banks.  
On the whole, our findings show that there is at least one ownership type (private-
owned banks) in which the presence of self-interest managers can be suspected. Hypothesis 2 
therefore holds as the null (H0) is rejected. Such commercial banks are dominant in Indonesia 
(71 banks out of a total of 104 commercial banks) and in our sample (65 banks out of a total 
of 99 banks). 
    
6. Robustness Checks 
 Beyond the use of various measures of inefficiency, risk and profitability to ensure the 
robustness of our results, we also consider alternative estimation methods and other 
specifications for the simultaneous equations model12.  First, instead of using the GMM 
method to estimate (2) and (5), we use the two stages least squares (2SLS) method and the 
three stage least squares (3SLS) method. Our main results remain identical. Second, we 
introduce four ownership dummies (SOB, POB, JVB, and FOB) into each structural equation 
in System (2). Hence, System (2) has to be estimated by using the method of Plumper and 
Troeger (2007). Here again, our main results remain unchanged.  
 Moreover, we change our proxy of bank risk following Boyd et al. (2006) which allow 
the Z-score to be volatile in each period. However, we use ROE instead of drawing the ratio 
of net income to total assets (ROA) used by Boyd et al. (2006). Formally let i be a bank index 
and t be a period index, then the alternative Z-score is defined as 
  
ti
ti
ti ADROE
ROE
ROE
,
,*
,
1
Z
 , 
where 
t
tititi ROET
ROEADROE
,,,
1
 is bank i time specific absolute deviation of the 
return on equity (ROE). The average of ROE is computed for the full sample period and a 
different value of ADROE is assigned for each period. Besides ZROE*, we examine another 
                                                 
12
 The results of robustness checks are not displayed in the paper but are available from the authors on request.  
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risk measure defined as the logarithm of the absolute deviation of the return on equity 
( LNADROE ) in a bank for each period. A higher value of LNADROE  is associated with an 
increase in asset risk due to risk-taking strategies that increase income volatility. Using these 
alternative risk measures and performing the GMM, 2SLS, and 3SLS estimations for System 
(1) and (2), our main results discussed in Section 5 remain consistent. 
 Finally, we consider NIM (the ratio of net interest income to total assets) as another 
proxy of the cost of intermediation. This procedure is consistent with Demirgüc-Kunt et al 
(2004). By conducting the GMM, 2SLS, and 3SLS for System (1) and (2), our main findings 
are not altered.  
7. Conclusion 
 This paper provides empirical evidence on the link between bank capital and risk 
under the managerial self-interest hypothesis which, to our knowledge, has not been 
empirically explored in the literature. In order to capture the presence of self-interested 
managers, we consider that a higher cost of intermediation or higher inefficiency due to an 
excessive reliance on monitoring following an increase in capital leading to lower profitability 
could be associated with a higher degree of managerial self-interest.  
 Our GMM estimations applied on monthly Indonesian data for the 2004-2007 period  
show that managers in Indonesian banks are likely to be self-interested. A deeper 
investigation shows that among the different bank ownership categories, private-owned banks 
are the ones which actually suffer from the presence of self-interested managers. Therefore, in 
the case of Indonesia any policy aiming to enforce shareholder domination, for instance 
through the Single Presence Policy, should take private-owned banks into very close 
consideration. Such a policy should mitigate inefficiency problems in private-owned banks 
due to the presence of self-interested managers but also aim to enhance the bank ownership 
consolidation process, since most of Indonesian banks are private-owned banks. 
 Moreover, foreign-owned banks exhibit greater performance compared to other types 
banks, since a higher capital ratio in foreign banks is associated with an increase in 
profitability without necessarily implying an increase in insolvency risk and risk taking.  This 
finding further suggests that increasing foreign participations in the process of banking sector 
consolidation in Indonesia can be necessary.    
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the overall period of study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
              
 Variables Definition  Mean  Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
SIZE The logarithm of bank's total asset (total asset is expressed in billion Rupiah) 14.543 14.413 19.531 9.466 1.982 
EQTA The ratio of equity to total asset 0.1572 0.1218 0.9961 0.000068 0.1266 
ROE The ratio of net income to equity 0.0126 0.0098 0.1895 -0.0653 0.0233 
ZROE The Z-score based on ROE 243.65 144.52 5078.34 6.69 303.55 
SDROE The standard deviation of ROE based on the six months rolling windows.  0.0129 0.0069 0.1583 0.0002 0.0157 
ROA The ratio of net income to total asset 0.0019 0.0017 0.2068 -0.1327 0.0071 
NIM The ratio of net interest income to total asset 0.0043 0.0042 0.1489 -0.1007 0.0054 
PERSON The ratio of personnel expense to operating revenue 0.3668 0.3423 1.298 0.00064 0.1852 
LDR The ratio of total loan to total deposit 1.5191 1.2536 9.0103 0.00099 1.0764 
CFIVE The total asset share of the five biggest banks in the banking industry 0.5668 0.5575 0.6081 0.5419 0.0191 
MPOW The bank's asset share in the banking industry 0.0103 0.0014 0.2258 0.000011 0.0272 
OVERHEAD The ratio of operating expense to total asset 0.0084 0.0079 0.1248 0.00054 0.0049 
GDPG The quarterly growth of the real gross domestic product 0.0463 0.0534 0.0708 0.0035 0.0223 
LOAN The ratio of total loan to total asset 0.5499 0.5795 0.9831 0.00033 0.1943 
DTA The ratio of total deposits to total asset 0.6742 0.7436 0.9191 0.6327 0.1943 
LLP The ratio of loan loss provision to total loan 0.0462 0.0251 0.8073 0.00074 0.2042 
IBA The Indonesian Banking Architecture dummy takes 1 after June 2005. 0.6458 1 1 0 0.4783 
SOB The state-owned bank dummy 0.0505 0 1 0 0.219 
POB The private-owned bank dummy 0.6566 1 1 0 0.4749 
JVB The joint-venture bank dummy 0.1818 0 1 0 0.3857 
FOB The foreign-owned bank dummy 0.1111 0 1 0 0.3143 
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Table 2. Pairwise Correlations  
 
           
       
  SIZE EQTA ROE ZROE SDROE ROA NIM PERSON LDR CFIVE 
       
SIZE 1          
       
EQTA -0.4120 1.0000         
       
ROE 0.2403 -0.1815 1.0000        
       
ZROE -0.0122 0.0746 -0.0174 1.0000       
       
SDROE 0.0504 -0.1385 0.3248 -0.2861 1.0000      
       
ROA 0.0800 0.0325 0.5644 0.0155 0.1731 1.0000     
       
NIM -0.1875 0.1392 0.1076 -0.0017 0.0184 0.1139 1.0000    
       
PERSON -0.2555 0.0376 -0.2712 -0.0265 0.0945 -0.2854 0.0686 1.0000   
       
LDR -0.0141 -0.1695 0.0143 -0.0049 0.0482 -0.0492 -0.0895 0.1224 1.0000  
       
CFIVE -0.0864 0.0124 0.0970 0.0035 0.0525 0.0244 0.0521 0.1010 0.0607 1.0000 
       
MPOW 0.6388 -0.1595 0.0877 -0.0089 -0.0090 0.0211 -0.1212 -0.0591 0.0982 -0.0014 1.0000       
OVERHEAD -0.1941 -0.0221 -0.0782 -0.0394 0.1243 -0.1310 0.1321 0.2287 -0.0351 -0.0895 -0.0846 1.0000      
GDPG -0.0289 0.0014 0.0104 -0.0069 -0.0244 -0.0056 0.0101 -0.0031 0.0048 0.0406 -0.0048 -0.0459 1.0000     
LOAN -0.0716 -0.0893 -0.0386 -0.0218 -0.0981 -0.0152 0.1701 -0.1068 -0.5484 -0.0457 -0.1711 0.1662 0.0107 1.0000    
DTA 0.1465 -0.5074 0.0402 -0.0564 0.0092 -0.0965 -0.0107 0.0805 0.3382 0.0373 0.1304 0.1631 0.0154 0.0895 1.0000   
LLP -0.0015 0.1773 0.0158 0.0100 0.0454 0.0399 -0.0544 0.1117 0.0525 0.1952 0.0887 -0.0842 0.0377 -0.2187 -0.2199 1.0000  
IBA 0.0862 -0.0142 -0.0995 -0.0068 -0.0286 -0.0215 -0.0571 -0.1109 -0.0618 -0.8628 0.0040 0.1184 -0.0719 0.0475 -0.0331 -0.1894 1.0000 
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Table 3. Regression outputs with RNIM as the measure of the cost of intermediation 
The models are estimated using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in a simultaneous equations system with individual fixed effects. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1 %, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Endogenous variables are the capital ratio (EQTA), the profitability-adjusted net interest margin measure  (RNIM), 
insolvency risk (ZROE), risk-taking (SDROE) and profitability (ROE and ROA). The bold fonts are introduced to assess Hypothesis 1: a higher capital ratio is associated with an increase in the 
cost of intermediation, but a decrease in risk and profitability.. Regression 1 uses ZROE as the dependent variable in the PERFORM equation as shown in (1), while Regressions 2, 3, and 4 
respectively use SDROE, ROE, and ROA . 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Variables EQTA RNIM ZROE EQTA RNIM SDROE EQTA RNIM ROE EQTA RNIM ROA 
RNIM 
  
75.773***  -32131*** 44.901***   1.619*** 40.957***   4.441*** 31.211**   0.3791*** 
(9.129)  (-3.937) (7.362)  (6.113) (4.556)  (5.475) (2.461)  (3.489) 
SIZE -0.021***   -0.092***    -0.029***   -0.038***   
  (-3.835)   (-15.512)    (-6.318)   (-6.766)   
GDPG -0.0145  -46.001 -0.1011  0.0047 -0.1721  0.0049 0.2209  0.0012 
  (-0.2083)  (-0.3146) (-0.9349)  (0.8651) (-1.306)  (0.3308) (1.231)  (0.4292) 
IBA 0.0256***   0.0314***    0.0277*   -0.0229   
  (2.875)   (5.523)    (1.808)   (-1.577)   
ZROE 0.0006*** -6.1E-06**              
  (5.148) (-2.571)              
SDROE     -18.03*** 0.2131**          
      (-11.049) (2.059)          
ROE          -3.869*** 0.2055**      
           (-2.23) (2.044)      
ROA          
   
-128.9*** -0.947*** 
 
            
  
(-6.616) (-3.405) 
 
EQTA   0.0067*** 666.18***   0.0061*** -0.019***  0.0235*** -0.108***   -0.00069 -0.023*** 
    (4.898) (3.819)   (5.004) (-3.793)  (3.457) (-8.607)   (-0.6933) (-7.784) 
CFIVE   0.0044*    0.0048    -0.0082    0.0193***  
    (1.826)    (0.6973)    (-0.6351)    (5.439)  
MPOW   -0.0177***    
-
0.0152***    0.0028    -0.008***  
    (-8.029)    (-4.449)    (0.9486)    (-4.117)  
OVERHEAD   -0.0147 
   
-0.1013 
   
-0.0932** 
   
-0.187***  
    (-0.5291)     (-1.251)     (-2.242)     (-4.849) 
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Continued 
LDR  -0.0003***     -0.001***     -4E-04***     -0.001***   
   (-5.618)    (-3.385)    (-2.643)    (-7.327)  
LOAN -0.329***  184.85*** -0.307***  -0.012*** -0.167***  -0.023*** 0.0667  -0.006*** 
  (-8.618)  (2.771) (-8.373)  (-5.426) (-3.919)  (-4.694) (0.8693)  (-5.767) 
LLP   -63.815    0.0109***   0.0135**    
-
0.0047*** 
    (-0.9593)    (5.56)   (2.567)    (-3.754) 
DTA   22.966    0.0056***   
-
0.0347***    
-
0.0075*** 
    (0.4981)    (3.227)   (-9.231)    (-9.462) 
SOB 0.7196*** -0.0024 -36.781 2.285*** -0.0058* 0.0218*** 0.9137*** -0.0035 0.0732*** 1.117*** 
-
0.0083*** 0.0142*** 
  (6.673) (-1.55) (-0.3597) (19.088) (-1.823) (6.336) (14.484) (-0.7009) (9.513) (14.031) (-5.386) (8.394) 
POB 0.4569*** -0.0011 52.434 1.795*** -0.0037 0.016*** 0.6817*** 0.0008 0.0636*** 0.8083*** 
-
0.0066*** 0.0137*** 
  (4.916) (-0.6564) (0.5801) (19.027) (-0.9919) (5.291) (13.716) (0.1413) (9.362) (12.132) (-4.326) (8.692) 
JVB 0.5999*** -0.0023 -46.611 1.955*** -0.0053 0.0194*** 0.8119*** -0.0025 0.0683*** 1.056*** 
-
0.0073*** 0.0153*** 
  (6.563) (-1.541) (-0.4712) (19.757) (-1.569) (5.891) (15.939) (-0.4943) (9.12) (13.289) (-4.871) (8.802) 
FOB 0.5381*** -0.0024* -36.781 2.262*** 
-
0.0087*** 0.0389*** 0.7077*** -0.0013 0.0902*** 0.8577*** 
-
0.0075*** 0.011*** 
  (6.641) (-1.67) (-1.454) (17.789) (-3.869) (14.058) (12.704) (-0.2849) (12.73) (11.01) (-4.891) (8.539) 
J-Statistic 0.0072 0.0072 0.0072 0.0102 0.0102 0.0102 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0075 0.0075 0.0075 
N 3488 3488 3488 3488 3488 3488 3906 3906 3906 3906 3906 3906 
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Table 4. Regression outputs with PERSON as the measure of the cost of intermediation 
The models are estimated using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in a simultaneous equations system with individual fixed effects. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1 %, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Endogenous variables are capital ratio (EQTA), personnel expenses ratio (PERSON), insolvency measure (ZROE), 
risk-taking measure (SDROE) and profitability measure (ROE and ROA). The bold fonts are introduced to assess Hypothesis 1: a higher capital ratio is associated with an increase in the cost of 
intermediation, but a decrease in risk and profitability. Regression 1 uses ZROE as the dependent variable in the PERFORM equation shown in (1), while Regressions 2, 3, and 4 respectively 
use SDROE, ROE, and ROA . 
 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Variables EQTA PERSON ZROE EQTA PERSON SDROE EQTA PERSON ROE EQTA PERSON ROA 
 PERSON 
  
1.132 
 
-461.33*** -0.0042 
 
0.0387*** -0.879*** 
 
0.1127*** 
-0.805***  0.0138*** 
(0.9777) 
 
(-5.691) (-0.0639) 
 
(12.344) (-16.227) 
 
(5.777) (-6.335)  (5.227) 
SIZE 0.0232   -0.129***    -0.15***   -0.109***   
  
(0.2259) 
  
(-16.187) 
   
(-20.485) 
  (-7.377)   
GDPG -0.2511  -34.859 -0.1426*  0.0031** -0.419***  0.0205 -0.1503  -0.0035 
  
(-0.475) 
 
(-0.4877) (-1.874) 
 (2.429) (-4.127)  (1.079) (-1.622)  (-0.8979) 
IBA -0.0073   0.00603    0.0133*   0.0153**   
  
(-0.897) 
  
(1.424) 
   
(1.832) 
  (2.085)   
ZROE 0.0018 -0.0013***              
  
(1.174) (-7.95) 
             
SDROE     -18.96*** 18.159***          
      
(-11.308) (4.285) 
         
ROE          0.2505 -13.82***      
           
(0.2272) (-10.679) 
     
ROA 
  
  
  
   
   
15.74* -12.61* 
 
            
  
(1.693) (-1.759) 
 
EQTA   0.6353*** 518.49***   0.2776*** -0.0173***  -0.0109 -0.126***   0.3954*** 2.18E-05 
    
(5.761) (4.714) 
  
(3.443) (-4.096) 
 
(-0.1386) (-9.239) 
  (5.781) (0.008) 
CFIVE   0.5893***    0.4263***    2.577***    1.155***  
    
(5.714) 
   
(3.191) 
   
(12.3) 
   (7.869)  
MPOW   -1.286*** 
   
-0.3822* 
   
-2.739*** 
   
-2.725***  
    
(-5.769) 
   
(-1.748) 
   
(-6.863) 
   (-8.984)  
OVERHEAD 
  -0.3309    2.675*    -1.559    2.291**  
    
(-0.7285) 
    
(1.888) 
   
(-0.7533) 
   (2.217) 
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Continued 
LDR   -0.0019    -0.023***    -0.024\***     0.0128***  
    
(-0.5202) 
   
(-2.912) 
   
(-2.919) 
   (4.079)  
LOAN 0.049  71.876** -0.103***  -0.0061*** -0.0044  -0.025*** 0.1087**  -0.005*** 
  
(0.1586) 
 
(1.982) (-5.684) 
 
(-6.337) (-0.2422) 
 
(-7.277) (2.469)  (-4.961) 
LLP   56.557    0.0017**   -
0.0348*** 
   0.0012 
    
(1.212) 
   
(2.358) 
  
(-3.339) 
   (0.4708) 
DTA    47.484**    0.0015   -
0.0698*** 
   
-0.0076*** 
     
(2.196) 
   
(0.9817) 
  
(-8.192) 
   (-6.559) 
SOB -1.076 0.3221*** 244.59*** 2.782*** -0.162*** 0.0054*** 3.159*** -0.655*** 0.0548*** 2.291*** -0.1794* 0.0043*** 
  
(-0.438) (5.403) (6.563) (18.213) (-2.692) (3.275) (24.583) (-6.228) (12.91) (7.562) (-1.706) (6.442) 
POB -1.118 0.3233*** 294.27*** 2.235*** -0.0844 0.0011 2.607*** -0.868*** 0.052*** 1.896*** -0.341*** 0.0046*** 
  
(-0.523) (5.097) (7.644) (18.227) (-1.396) (0.7112) (24.835) (-8.401) (12.781) (7.643) (-3.782) (6.41) 
JVB -0.894 0.1313** 178.91*** 2.397*** -0.203*** 0.0063*** 2.716*** -0.963*** 0.0593*** 1.957*** -0.435*** 0.0057*** 
  
(-0.439) (2.177) (5.219) (18.727) (-3.579) (3.828) (25.451) (-9.604) (13.534) (7.496) (-5.236) (7.456) 
FOB -0.8689 0.1153** 157.29*** 2.762*** -0.429*** 0.0204*** 2.679*** -0.2592** 0.0704*** 1.983*** -0.277*** 0.0039*** 
  
(-0.413) (2.065) (4.893) (17.611) (-6.581) (13.19) (26.303) (-2.502) (15.696) (7.062) (-3.376) (6.851) 
J-Statistic 0.00203 0.00203 0.00203 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0146 0.0146 0.0146 0.0095 0.0095 0.0095 
N 3528 3528 3528 3528 3528 3528 3873 3873 3873 4001 4001 4001 
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Table 5. Regression outputs to analyze the influence of banks ownership type when RNIM is used as the measure of the cost of intermediation 
The models are estimated using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in a simultaneous equations system with individual fixed effects. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1 %, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Endogenous variables are capital ratio (EQTA), the profitability-adjusted net interest margin (RNIM), insolvency 
measure (ZROE), risk-taking measure (SDROE) and profitability (ROE and ROA). The bold fonts are introduced to assess Hypothesis 2: There is a different impact of a higher capital ratio on 
the cost of intermediation, risk and profitability among banks with a different ownership type. Regression 1 uses ZROE as the dependent variable in the PERFORM equation shown in System 
(1), while Regressions 2, 3, and 4 respectively use SDROE, ROE, and ROA . 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Variables EQTA RNIM ZROE EQTA RNIM SDROE EQTA RNIM ROE EQTA RNIM ROA 
RNIM 40.051***   14323.63 20.549*   -0.6759 41.852***  3.839** 40.602***  0.0917 
  (3.949)  (0.7045) (1.679)  (-0.7349) (4.429)  (2.442) (4.088)  (0.3561) 
SIZE -0.0323**   -0.097***    -0.0412**    -0.0220   
  (-2.151)   (-5.343)    (-2.537)    (-1.065)   
GDPG -0.0599  0.8819 -0.0528  0.00047 -0.2851**  -0.0119 -0.192  -0.0036 
  (-0.4350)  (0.0041) (-0.4172)  (0.0491) (-1.978)  (-0.6819) (-1.569)  (-1.141) 
IBA 0.0106   0.0133    0.0538***    0.0337***   
  (0.8273)   (1.393)    (3.591)    (2.753)   
ZROE 0.0012*** -3.5E-05***              
  (4.759) (-3.505)              
SDROE     -18.31*** 0.0473          
      (-5.319) (0.1939)          
ROE          0.5889 0.1779***      
           (0.2428) (2.737)      
ROA 
  
  
  
   
    
-17.119 0.6319** 
 
            
   
(-1.264) (2.384) 
 
EQTA*SOB   0.1164 5373.82   0.2814 0.0517  0.1893** -0.1647  0.3255** -0.0159 
    (0.6522) (0.9837)   (0.9949) (0.2048)  (2.013) (-0.4468)  (2.435) (-0.3138) 
EQTA*POB   0.0148** 4843.47***   0.0017 -0.174***  -0.00301 -0.1934*  0.0076 -0.053*** 
    (2.387) (3.576)   (0.1186) (-2.608)  (-0.6910) (-1.668)  (1.456) (-2.919) 
EQTA*JVB   0.0199*** -1087.63**   0.0054 0.0849***  0.0222*** -0.0901*  0.0157*** -0.0025 
    (3.285) (-2.103)   (0.3285) (2.819)  (4.416) (-1.947)  (3.767) (-0.2835) 
EQTA*FOB   -0.1453 -27947**   0.1401 0.9369  0.1834 1.076  0.2599 0.3936** 
    (-0.7854) (-1.963)   (0.2728) (1.442)  (1.568) (1.085)  (1.683) (2.509) 
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Continued 
CFIVE   -0.0094    0.0032    -0.0086    0.0035  
    (-0.9017)    (0.279)    (-0.9073)    (0.4955)  
MPOW   -0.0053    0.0821    0.0598**    0.1036**  
    (-0.0924)    (0.6266)    (2.017)    (2.033)  
OVERHEAD 
  
-0.0629 
   
0.0671 
   
0.0043 
   
0.0158 
 
    (-0.9238)    (0.5087)    (0.2262)    (0.7826)  
LDR   
-
0.00075***    -0.00045    -0.00013    -0.00014  
    (-2.743)    (-0.4364)    (-0.6303)    (-0.5983)  
LOAN   50.748 -0.1846***  -0.0066 -0.0955**  -0.0083 -0.0774  0.00026 
    (0.5505) (-3.554)  (-1.425) (-2.136)  (-1.245) (-1.596)  (0.1869) 
LLP   -800.92***    0.0428***    0.0317*   0.0045 
    (-3.282)    (3.329)    (1.659)   (1.225) 
DTA   740.91**    -0.0119    -0.0434*   -0.0086** 
      (2.085)     (-0.7272)     (-1.667)     (-2.067) 
J-statistic 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.0153 0.0154 0.0155 0.0158 0.0158 0.0158 
N 3488 3488 3488 3489 3490 3491 3906 3907 3908 3906 3907 3908 
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Table 6. Regression outputs to analyze the influence of banks ownership type with PERSON as the measure of the cost of intermediation 
The models are estimated using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in a simultaneous equations system with individual fixed effects. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at the 1 %, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Endogenous variables are capital ratio (EQTA), the personnel expenses ratio (PERSON), insolvency measure 
(ZROE), risk-taking measure (SDROE) and profitability (ROE and ROA). The bold fonts are introduced to assess Hypothesis 2: There is a different impact of a higher capital ratio on the cost of 
intermediation, risk and profitability among banks with a different ownership type.  Regression 1 uses ZROE as the dependent variable in the PERFORM equation shown in System (1), while 
Regressions 2, 3, and 4 respectively use SDROE, ROE, and ROA 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Variables EQTA PERSON ZROE EQTA PERSON SDROE EQTA PERSON ROE EQTA PERSON ROA 
PERSON 2.148   -288.35 -0.1982  0.0417*** -1.191***  0.0809** -0.4877**  0.0205*** 
  (1.018)  (-1.458) (-0.5128)  (5.127) (-4.454)  (2.107) (-2.279)  (3.511) 
SIZE 0.1331   -0.124***    -0.148***    -0.0453**   
  (0.7324)   (-5.6)    (-7.987)    (-2.138)   
GDPG 0.7577  -156.85 -0.1931*  -0.00018 -0.3129**  0.0174 -0.051   
  (0.9388)  (-0.8062) (-1.794)  (-0.0381) (-2.238)  (0.8102) (-0.3773)   
IBA 0.0110   -0.0035    -0.012    0.0122   
  (0.3956)   (-0.3277)    (-0.608)    (1.594)   
ZROE 0.0035* 0.0014              
  (1.918) (0.8333)              
SDROE     -20.23*** 30.946***          
      (-4.882) (3.385)          
ROE          -1.605 -6.983      
           (-0.5773) (-1.495)      
ROA 
  
  
  
   
    
27.744*** 40.698 
 
            
   
(6.159) (1.177) 
 
EQTA*SOB   25.326 2326.72   2.187 0.296503  21.945** -0.1108  2.586 -0.0426 
    (1.479) (0.9512)   (0.3461) (1.987)  (2.557) (-0.4317)  (0.1324) (-0.7131) 
EQTA*POB   0.8407 727.9*   0.2858 0.0428  0.6462** -0.1667**  -0.6655 0.0183 
    (1.443) (1.601)   (1.055) (1.613)  (2.433) (-2.041)  (-0.8951) (1.448) 
EQTA*JVB   -2.749* 334.83   0.1735 -0.0256  -1.741*** -0.1705*  -2.25*** -0.0013 
    (-1.745) (0.7815)   (0.3061) (-1.111)  (-3.627) (-1.867)  (-2.668) (-0.0788)     
EQTA*FOB   72.545** -2848.06   -9.579 -0.6889**  30.447*** 1.782**  31.554** 0.0898 
    (2.216) (-0.6052)   (-0.7332) (-1.972)  (2.665) (2.371)  (1.978) (0.9294) 
 
 
 
  34 
Continued 
CFIVE   -0.3752    0.0538    0.8102    -0.5896  
    (-0.4129)    (0.1301)    (0.9519)    (-0.4991)  
MPOW   13.758*    0.3163    6.071**    3.134  
    (1.889)    (0.1264)    (2.163)    (0.5377)  
OVERHEAD 
  
6.999 
   
-1.308 
   
0.9428 
   
2.921 
 
    (1.345)    (-0.5727)    (0.4039)    (1.391)  
LDR   0.0845*    -0.0709**    0.0338*    0.0338  
    (1.816)    (-2.042)    (1.709)    (1.589)  
LOAN -0.4409  91.089 -0.1035  -0.011*** 0.0287  -0.0142* 0.0299  -0.0018 
  (-1.319)  (1.427) (-1.518)  (-2.897) (0.5372)  (-1.733) (0.5501)  (-1.257) 
LLP   -61.212    -0.0138    -0.0124    -0.0045 
    (-0.3688)    (-1.558)    (-0.349)    (-0.9243) 
DTA   85.286    0.0191***    -0.088***    -0.0066** 
      (0.7481)     (2.855)     (-5.767)     (-2.337) 
J-statistic 0.00071 0.00071 0.00071 0.0052 0.0052 0.0052 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 
N 3528 3528 3528 3528 3528 3528 3873 3873 3873 4001 4001 4001 
 
 
